What involves more than just registering, reflecting, or even understanding words that are said?

Page 2

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 3

Page 4

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 5

Page 6

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 7

Page 8

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 9

Page 10

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 11

Page 12

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 13

Page 14

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 15

Page 16

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 17

Page 18

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 19

Page 20

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 21

Page 22

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 23

Page 24

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection

Page 25

Page 26

the requirement of the agreement to become qualified on the “A” list, as he was not "properly registered."

Although Haile did qualify for the “A” list insofar as the time worked for an employer who was signatory to the agreement, his failure to become “properly registered" was a condition that he did not accomplish, and thus the argument is rejected that he was qualified as a workman on the “A” list under the terms of the Arizona Master Labor Agreement. It also follows that if he was not qualified under the "A" list, that there was no contractual obligation on the part of Respondent to refer Haile under the terms of the dispatching procedures included in the Arizona Master Labor Agreement.

Even assuming that the record does establish that Haile was a workman qualified on the “A” list in Flagstaff, the violation claimed by the General Counsel is still not established by this record for another basic reason.

The question of a hiring arrangement between Prime Construction Co., Inc.

and Respondent, Local 394

Prime Construction Co., Inc. was signatory to the 1959–62 Arizona Master Labor Agreement, which expired on May 31, 1962. Prime had not, at the time of the hearing in this matter, become a signatory to the 1962–65 agreement. It is an essential element of the General Counsel's case to establish that Prime was obligated to obtain its workmen exclusively through Respondent's hiring hall.

In view of the fact that the record reflects the Prime Construction Co., Inc., was not a signatory to the 1962–65 Master Labor Agreement, it is incumbent upon the General Counsel to establish by other evidence in what manner Prime Construction Co.

, Inc., was obligated to obtain its workmen through Respondent's hiring hall exclusively. This calls for evidence establishing an implied agreement obligating Prime Construction Co., Inc., to use the hiring hall.

The General Counsel relies on evidence in the record that reflects that after Prime Construction Co., Inc., no longer was bound by the terms of the 1959–62 agreement, it did hire one employee subsequent to May 1962 through the hiring hall. Prime also continued payments to the health and welfare fund for employees represented by the crafts that were signatory to the Master Labor Agreement. To sustain the General Counsel's position, it must be found that Prime was obligated to use the dispatching facilities of Respondent. It is found that all that the evidence establishes is that Prime voluntarily continued payments into the health and welfare fund and, on one occasion, called upon Respondent to furnish a workman. This falls far short of establishing an obligation on the part of Prime to secure its workmen through Respondent.

The specific claim of discrimination alleged in the complaint refers to the failure of Respondent, acting through Confer, to issue a referral to Haile to work for Prime. Because, as has been found, Haile was not qualified on the “A” list and because Prime was not obligated to utilize the exclusive hiring hall dispatching procedures, it is found that the General Counsel has failed to establish that Respondent acted unlawfully in connection with Haile's failure to obtain employment with Prime.

The complaint also alleges in general terms that since July 20, 1962, Respondent has refused to, and is refusing to, clear Haile for employment, pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, and to place him on the "A" list.

The evidence relating to this is that Haile's book had cleared through the International in about May 1961 and that he took no steps for approximately a year after that to have his book transferred into Local 394. When Haile quit Mann's employment in May 1962, he telephoned Parker and asked him about transferring his book, and, on this occasion, Parker told him that he had charges that he would have to answer to, and Haile said that he would have charges of his own. The conVersation was acrimonious in that it reflected Parker's disinclination to have Haile's book transferred into Local 394, and Haile's statement to Parker that he would work without the Union. However, there is nothing in the record which reflects any attempt on the part of Haile to have his name put on any out-of-work list. As previ. ously indicated, since the record does not establish Haile requested his name be put on the “A” list after he quit Mann, the question is not reached here as to what his rights would have been had his application been rejected.

On this record it would appear that Haile erroneously equated union membership with special employment privileges. The undenied and credited testimony of Parker establishes that about 50 percent of the “A” list workmen in Flagstaff and about 10 percent of the “A” list registrants were not union members.

The charges that Respondent preferred against Haile for failing to comply with the terms of the International constitution were mentioned by Parker in connection